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BOOK REVIEWS
THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS. By 'Milton R. Konvitz. ONew York:
Columbia University Press. 1947. Pp. x, 254. ,3.00.

Perhaps it is odd to begin a review by quoting a dedication. But in this case I
may be excused because I was so much impressed with the present author's dedication. It reads:
"For my father and my brother Benzion. You as a lump of salt have been thrown
into water and have become into water and cannot be taken out again: and, whenever taste the water, it is salt."
The moral conviction and sincerity which run through this book have a deep
well-spring here.
As a former teacher of Jurisprudence at Columbia University, Professor Konvitz
knew very well, as he says in his preface, that

"Freedom comes only from the law; but not all law gives freedom."
That sentence is another way of stating the basic problem of a philosophy of law,

of jurisprudence itself, on condition that the word "law' is not used taivocally.
Konvitz treats of the relationship between the Constitution and such civil rights
as the rights of persons to employment, to accommodations in hotels, restaurants,
common carriers and other places of public accommodation and resort.
In the last paragraph of his preface, the author himself summarizes vell the
basic conclusions of his study; though I do not think he was quite successful in
elucidating the "badges of slavery":
"In many of our states there are laws which compel people to v.ear the badges of
slavery; but the Supreme Court, deciding cases on the issue of States' rights, has
held such laws to be constitutional. Government by law . . . must be substituted
for government by caprice and unlimited discretion. But the law itself must also
be free from caprice. The desired result will not be achieved if the states are left
to their own devices. It can be achieved only through effective congressional legislational, national in scope, and rooted in the soil from which have come the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment. It can be
achieved only through the Supreme Court overruling earlier precedents which were
decided on the basis of states' rights instead of human rights and the rights of
citizens in a free community. There should be no place in the Constitution for a
distinction between citizens as first class and second class."
To arrive at this conclusion, Professor Konvitz, in the first place (after a brief
summary of federal legislation during the years 1866 to 1877) makes an acute analysis of the famous Civil Rights cases decided in 1883. I think that every law school
student reading those cases for the first time is left wondering as to their rationale.
Even a number of re-readings of these cases leaves one with the "ashes-in-themouth" reaction of overly clever dialectics. Professor Konvitz's analysis of these
caseg, together with his underlining of the good dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Harlan, makes good reading.
A real contribution is made by the discussion of IS U. S. C. 511 and the cases
based upon it, especially the Screws case,2 which by a 6 to 3 vote saves the consti1. REv. STrT. § 50S (1870), 18 U. S. C. § 51 (1940).
2. Screws v. United States. 325 U. S. 91 (1945).
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tutionality of Section 52, 3 and by implication, Section 514 of the U. S. Code. As
Professor Konvitz puts it, the case preserves ". . . a link between the Federal govment and the protection of the Negro against deprivation of his life, liberty, and
property without due process of law by state officials acting under state law or
acting contrary to state law, and against deprivation of his rights or privileges under
the Constitution or federal law by two or more private persons acting together in
a conspiracy." 5
The author properly ventures the opinion that the decision in the Screws case
provides a basis for Federal anti-lynching legislation.
The point of departure for discussion of the very difficult subject of federal legislation against discrimination in employment is the bill( which Mrs. Norton offered
in the 79th Congress.
"It seems ironical that under our Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court,
the evil of discrimination in employment can be reached only under the guise of
regulation of interstate commerce. It is through a back door that the new concept,
the new 'immunity' of7' the right to work at gainful employment, will be received
into the Constitution."
Consideration of the state statutes prohibiting or restricting discrimination starts
with the case of Railway Mail Association v. Corsi.8 This reviewer may be allowed
a peculiar satisfaction with that decision. It arose out of, and vindicated, a formal
letter of legal opinion prepared by this reviewer while he was Deputy Industrial
Commissioner and Counsel in the New York State Department of Labor some
years ago. Nor is there anything in the treatment which Konvitz gives to state
statutes compelling or allowing segregation or discrimination which could arouse
the resentment of men of good will.
The appendices, occupying the last 95 pages of the book, include complete or
partial quotations from actual or proposed federal or state laws on the subject of
discrimination. For example, on page 148, there appears a "Model State Civil Rights
Bill" as proposed by the American Civil Liberties Union. The proposal seems to
carry legislation of this type beyond what would be constitutional and reasonable
in the iatter of private or parochial schools.
The object of laws against discrimination should be to proscribe discriminations
based upon malice, uncharity, injustice or other irrational motives or purposes. Some
discriminations are reasonable. They involve no infringement upon the great moral
mandate to be just and charitable. Legislation which seeks to reduce all cultural
strains to one level or which is predicated upon some assumed lowest common
denominator of religious belief is self-defeating. Our society is a pluralist society.
Regimented unity will not abolish the rational foundation for such pluralism. It
can be as artificial and as brittle as the unity which the Nazis and the Communists
have paraded. A willingness to recognize the legitimate scope of human differences
and of systems of personal choice is not always violative of justice or charity. I
see no reason why, for example, the Jewish Theological Seminary should be stigmatized for admitting only Jews or why a school run by a religious organization should
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

REV. STAT. § 5510 (1870), 18 U. S. C. § 52 (1940).
REv. STAT. § 5508 (1870), 18 U. S. C. § 51 (1940).

P. 61.
H. R. REP. No. 2232, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 187 (1945).
P. 96.
326 U. S. 88 (1945).
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be required by law to welcome those of another faith. The only sound basis for
unity is the one which so genuinely respects freedom of religion as to permit religionists to maintain their spiritual integrity as an organized, organic and "different" group within the larger but not omnicompetent national whole. On the social
plane there must be agreement on the basic natural law verities or there can be
no unity or peace, with or without legislation. It is only an uneasy compromise
which eventually complicates chaos to try the tyrannical expedient of laws to dissolve religious pluralism into a coerced unity on the religious plane.
"When Poland or Germany or Spain denies basic freedom to a group of its own
citizens, the citizens of other nations cannot stand by, out of respect for the principle of national self-determination . . "
Such language also only finds a fair target in Soviet Russia. It is implicit with a
recognition that we should be free to differ theologically within the unity of a
single political and constitutional system. If we agree to disagree on theological
grounds, the freedom to do this is part of the panoply of genuine political liberty.
The common good should always be big enough to include those who, while they
respect highly the things that are Caesar's, are still more respectful of God's things.
Among the true worshippers of God, no matter what their theological discriminations, there will be none whom we need fear politically as the purveyors of the
uncharity, hatred or unreason which significantly endangers the common veal. And
religious discriminations do not all imply malice or social evils.
GODFREY P. ScHMr=Tt

LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE LAW. By Charles S. Rhyne. Washington,
D. C.: National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, 1946. Pp. 583. $10.00.
This book examines in many of its aspects the problem of the municipal employees vis-a-vis the labor union movement. Most of the volume (426 pages) is
given over to an appendix of quotations of court decisions, court orders, attorney
generals' opinions, opinions of administrative boards or tribunals, opinions of corporation counsels or city attorneys, briefs, ordinances and similar materials bearing upon the subject of the unionization of municipal employees in its various
ramifications.
The text outside of the appendix occupies only 156 pages. In the first four
parts: the author summarizes court decisions on the right of municipal employees to organize and join labor unions; on the power of municipalities to
contract with labor unions representing municipal employees especially with regard to strikes and picketing; etc. Reference is made to state constitutional provisions and state statutes upon the subject. A few authorities from Federal,
Canadian and British jurisdictions are cited and the opinions of attorney generals
in fifteen states summarized. The experience of fifty-nine cities or municipalities
is briefly related; and there is a precis of the opinions of city attorneys, city ordinances, resolutions and contracts. Part V presents a summary of the chief subjects
and points covered by the formal opinions of state attorney generals and city attorneys in this connection. Part VI is devoted to a series of summary references
to policies of Federal officers or agencies such as the President, the Attorney Gen9. P. 105.
t Lecturer in Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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eral, T. V. A., Inland Waterways Corporation, Alaska Railroads, and S. E. C.
Finally, Part VII is devoted to the opinions of Joseph A. Padway, General Counsel
for the A. F. of L., Lee Pressman, General Counsel for the C. I. 0., the National
Civil Service Reform League, and a series of nine general authorities whose books
or articles ae cited.
The author lists twelve conclusions (Part VIII) which represent what he believes to be the majority view. Minority viewpoints are, however, stated. Nowhere
does the author submit these twelve conclusions to critical analysis and appraisal.
In general, the book is a careful and painstaking review of existing laws, opinions,
and experience upon a subject which will unquestionably evoke mixed reactions and
applications as the years go on. No well-rounded discussion of the philosophy of
trade unionism in relation to governmental employees is to be found here. At best,
this book provides merely the point of departure for such a philosophy. I find
nothing in the book which improves upon Judge Brandeis' basic generalization: "In
a free country everyone, be he an employer or an employee, be he in the public
or in private service, should have an opportunity to combine with any other persons
or persons for the purpose of improving his condition. The right to combine is absolute; but the action of a combination must necessarily be confined to such action
as is lawful, and should be confined to such action as is reasonable."'
I cannot quite agree with the first conclusion set down by Mr. Rhyne: "Municipal employes may organize their own union or affiliate with other unions except
fn those instances where, from the nature of their employment, union membership
may be prohibited or limited as incompatible with the public duties which particular
city employes must perform. ' 2 What can possibly be the nature of employment in
governmental service which prohibits mere organization or affiliation with unions
which have no policy of strike against government? In what cases can public duties
be incompatible with the exercise of free association (as long as that right is not
conjoined with the unreasonable assertion of the right to strike against the public)? I can well understand why labor unions among governmerital employees would
have to be restricted in their right to collective bargaining, or even in their right
to picket. But I cannot understand why under our free institutions men should be
precluded from the natural law right of free association simply because they are
governmental employees.
The majority view that

any contract between a municipality and a labor

"...

union covering terms and conditions of employment of public employees is void as a
delegation of public power to a private group . . ."3 seems to me to be broader

than it should be. There is no substitute for considering each agreement of this
kind separately on the basis of its own specific terms, as the minority advocates.
The administrator in government service sometimes has discretion, within at least
a limited area, to formulate employment policies involving alternatives within the
frame of civil service laws or equivalent rules or ordinances. I see no reason why
contracts between a municipality and a labor union (within this narrow area, and to
select one of several available alternatives) should be prohibited.
But I agree with the majority rule that "collective bargaining" in the ordinary
sense is out of the question where governmental administrators take the place of
employers. The powers of employers are very different from those of governmental officials. Labor union representatives or other citizens should always be ac1. MAsoN, BRADEis (1946)
2. P. 150 (italics added).
3. P. 151 (italics added).

150.
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corded the reasonable right to sit down to discuss matters with municipal administrators. But that right presupposes a reasonable recognition of the manner in which
the administrator's discretion is bound by existing laws or ordinances. Such laws
and ordinances should always, in my opinion, take precedence over the kind of
discretion which can be regularized or memorialized by a collective bargaining agreement between a union and, say, a commissioner. In that respect municipal employees have the same right as any other member of the public to bring presure
upon the duly authorized governmental legislators. To substitute self-help in place of
persuasion in such cases is merely another way of repudiating law and order.
President Roosevelt (who could not, I think, be regarded as unfriendly to labor)
recognized this in his statement: "The process of collective bargaining, as usually
understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service. It has its distinct and
insurmountable limitations when applied to public management. The very nature
and purpose of government make it impossible for administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions with Government employee organization." 4 To come to an opposite conclusion would be the same as to
say that governmental officials and legislatures should be replaced by the private
rule-makers in collective bargaining between the officials of government and labor
unions. Collective bargaining can never properly be conceived of as an unconditioned or absolute process. It rests (even for its own enforcement) on a foundation of government. It cannot replace its own foundation. Where our political
institutions are involved, the exigency for limitation and conditioning by law is
all the more pronounced. Liberty for all of us can be effectual and valid only to
the degree in which we take part in our political system by complying with R~s good
laws or by improving or repealing our bad ones. The omnicompetent method of
improvement is not collective bargaining.
When we speak of a juridical order in the concrete we mean an order in formation rather than order in complete achievement. But the very process of formation
would be impeded if private groups could make their own rules to replace or displace legal standards.
To my mind, a most obvious limitation upon collective bargaining for governtal employees concerns the so-called "closed shop" in its variant forms. Such an
incident to collective bargaining for governmental employees is in my opinion
especially out of place. I quite agree with the majority condemnation of such
monopolies and discriminations as incompatible with the legal rules reasonably appropriate for governmental employees. As Don Luigi Sturzo has written in his
book, "The Inner Laws of Society": "Today in a democratic regime, the state is
almost as omnipotent as in a totalitarian one. There is only one great difference:
that in a democratic regime there is the freedom of the press, of assembly, of voting, there is the possibility of modifying majorities, overturning the government
without recourse to revolts and wars." Toleration of the "closed shop" principle
in government employment would restrict this possibility and bring us to dangerous proximity to a totalitarian regime.
Finally, I agree in the main with Conclusions 10 and 11 as listed by Mr. Rhyne:
"10. It is conceded that there is no right of strike for governmental employees.
11. It is conceded that any picketing which prevents or interferes with the carrying out of a city's functions is illegal. ' *
4. P. 436.
5. P. 152.
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It seems to me that only circumstances and events of the order of those which
would morally justify revolution or rebellion can justify strikes of governmental
employees. Even in industrial conflict the strike is morally unjustifiable, unless it
is an absolutely last recourse. The urgency that the right to rebel be considered an
ultimate recourse is far, far greater. Every government is simply an order and a
defense of that order. If the order is bad; if in some respects the order contains
elements of disorder; the means for improvement should be those legally available
to the citizens at large. Governmental employees because of their peculiarly strategic position should not be permitted to capitalize their own selfish interests without regard for the common good. When the situation gets so bad as to warrant
revolution or rebellion there is no longer any question of a juridical system.
All in all, in these days of industrial and social ferment, the book is a very
convenient tool for city officials faced with the problems of unionized civil service
workers.
GODEREY P. ScHMIDTI
t

Lecturer in Law, Fordham University, School of Law.

